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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper uses informed trading to examine information content of earnings and dividends 
announcements. The major innovation of this research design is a combination of assessing 
information contents of dividends and earnings announcements based on their surprises and 
estimating informed trading to understand market reaction. The premise of this study is that if 
announcements contain information it should reflect on traders’ trading patterns. Based on this 
premise, I find evidence of significant change in informed trading for dividend announcements 
but not for earnings announcements when the announcements are made concurrently, an issue 
which the existing literature does not address. I also find significant differences in informed 
trading when dividend announcements contain surprises but not when dividends announcements 
contain no surprises, which the extent literature provides no empirical evidence. These results 
collectively imply that dividends are better signal than earnings to market participants. More 
importantly, contrary to recent findings that suggest a decline in information content of 
dividends, the results confirm significant information content of dividends. This study highlights 
the importance of identification and control of information environment and disaggregating 
dividends announcements based on its surprises while studying information content of 
announcement.   
 
 
Keywords: Dividends and Earnings Surprises, Informed Trading. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper introduces a new dimension to extent literature by assessing the information 
content of corporate announcements using informed trading. This study considers a market set- 
up where the information environment is not exogenous; rather, it depends on the content of 
corporate announcements. Instead of studying the price impact of announcements, this paper 
studies the impact of corporate announcements on informed trading. Another key novelty of this 
paper is that the research design adequately identifies and controls information environment 
while assessing the impact of announcements on informed trading.  
 
The effects of earnings announcements on market microstructure parameters have drawn 
interest of many researchers. Early research by Morse and Ushman (1983) find no change in 
daily bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements, while Vankatesh and Chiang (1986) 
and Patel (1991) report that bid-ask spread changes after the earnings announcements.  Using 
intraday bid-ask spread and volume, Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) report an increase in 
spreads and a decrease in depth a day before the announcement. Krinsky and Lee (1996) 
decompose the intraday bid-ask spread surrounding the earnings announcements and report that 
information asymmetry increases significantly before and after the earnings announcements. A 
more recent study by Chae (2005) reports that abnormal trading volume decrease before the 
scheduled announcements. 
 
Similarly earlier work by Venkatash and Chiang (1986) investigates the bid-ask spread 
prior to dividend announcements and reports that for certain types of dividend announcements 
bid-ask spread increases and for other types of announcements there is no significant change in 
bid-ask spread. Bajaj and Vijh (1995) find evidence of excess returns, increased trading volume 
and price volatility during the dividend announcements days which suggests increase in 
information asymmetry. More recently, Fuller (2003) provides direct evidence of an inverse 
relation between the pre-announcements informed trading and announcements day excess 
returns.  
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The extent literature on the effect of earnings and dividends announcements has several 
issues. Most of these papers either use abnormal returns or bid-ask spreads as the metric to 
examine the effects of these announcements. It is documented in the asset pricing literature that 
there is no unique way to estimate abnormal returns. Hence, it is plausible that the reported 
results are highly sensitive to the models used for estimation of abnormal returns. Alternatively 
some studies have used bid-ask spreads to examine the announcements effect. Although bid-ask 
spreads are easy to compute, but it provide only a snap-shot of market liquidity. There are not 
many papers using other measures to evaluate the information content of announcements. So 
there is a need for more comprehensive analysis of market reaction to corporate announcements. 
This paper contributes to ongoing literature by evaluating the information content of earnings 
and dividends announcements using informed trading as a more comprehensive market 
microstructure metric.     
   
Moreover, most of these studies have examined the impact of earnings announcements 
only when in reality, earnings and dividends announcements are made concurrently. Failure to 
control the information environment may completely distort empirical findings. For example, if 
we study effect of dividend announcements without controlling the information content of 
concurrent earnings announcements then the reported abnormal returns/bid-ask spread may 
potentially understate true effect of dividend announcements. So there is a clear need to re-
evaluate the information content of earnings and dividends announcements using a research 
design that explicitly identifies and controls information environment. This paper contributes to 
ongoing literature by re-evaluating the information content of earnings and dividends 
announcement using a research design that rely on conditional sorting which adequately and 
sufficiently identifies and controls information environment.   
 
Another observation is that most of the papers in extent literature examine the 
information content of dividend announcements without classifying announcements based on 
their surprises. According to dividend signaling hypothesis, only the unexpected changes in 
dividend has information content. Hence, failure to address the importance of surprises in 
dividends may potentially bias our understanding of true effect of dividend announcements. So 
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this paper contributes to literature by examining the information content of dividend 
announcements with proper classification of announcements based on their surprises.  
 
Hence, the research agenda for this paper has two fold. In this paper I address the 
question how do concurrent dividends and earnings announcements affect pre-and post-
announcements informed trading? This question is mainly motivated by recent empirical 
findings and guideline provided by the analytical models.1 The second question addressed in this 
paper is how do surprises in dividends affect pre-and post-announcements informed trading? 
 
The basic premise of studying the changes in informed trading is that if traders can 
anticipate the timing of announcements then traders’ will have incentive to acquire information if 
they anticipate that the announcement will have significant information content. Once informed 
traders acquire information in an anticipation of an announcement, it is likely that informed 
traders will avail the information advantage and are more likely to trade prior to announcements. 
Subsequently, actual dividends or earnings announcements partially resolve the uncertainty and 
prices tend to reflect available information. Eventually informed traders’ information advantage 
may not prevail after the announcements hence informed trading is likely to decline. Using same 
line of argument, if the traders’ anticipate that corporate announcements will not contain any 
significant information content, then acquisition of information is not profitable for them and it 
leads to no change in informed trading before and after the announcements.    
 
I conjecture that if dividends are considered as signal then for concurrent dividend 
announcements with surprises, informed trading during the pre-announcement period will be 
higher than post-announcement period. I also conjecture that if earnings are considered as signal 
then for concurrent earnings announcements with surprises, informed trading during the pre-
announcement period should be higher than that of post-announcement period. To address the 
second question, I conjecture that for dividend announcements with surprises, informed trading 
during the pre-announcements period will be higher than post-announcements period and for 
                                                             
1 Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) for dividend signaling 
models.   
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dividend announcements with no surprise, there will be no significant change in informed 
trading.  
 
I use the probability of informed trading (PIN)2 as a proxy for informed trading. I 
estimate PIN for 28 trading days before and after earnings and dividends announcements. For the 
first part of the study, I construct two portfolios. Portfolio one includes firms with the highest 
absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute surprises in dividends. Portfolio two 
constitutes firms with the highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises 
in earnings. These portfolios include only the concurrent earnings and dividends announcements. 
For the second part of the study, I construct two more portfolios. Portfolio three constitutes firms 
with highest surprises in dividends and lowest surprises in earnings. Portfolio four includes 
firms that have lowest surprises in dividends and earnings.  Portfolio three and four include 
dividends and earnings announcements whether made concurrently or separately. The unique 
feature of this research design is that identifies and control information environment pertaining 
to different corporate announcements.      
 
I find significant difference in PIN for a group of firms that have the highest absolute 
surprises in dividends and the lowest absolute surprises in earnings. However, for the group of 
firms that contain the highest absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute surprises in 
dividends I find no significant change in PIN. Collectively, these results suggest that dividend 
announcements contain information beyond that is conveyed by the earnings announcements.  
 
One of the explanations of why earnings announcements do not convey information is 
that the management provides “earnings guidelines” periodically and mostly prior to actual 
announcements, which help market and analyst update their predictions. Hence, by the time firm 
makes earnings announcement, even the surprises in earnings no longer convey significant 
information. On the other hand, dividends are viewed as “sticky” and usually management do not 
change (increase or decrease) dividends often and do not provide dividends guidelines; as a 
result change in dividends conveys significant information about firm’s future earnings 
                                                             
2 The methodology section outlines the estimation issues regarding informed trading and surprises in 
dividends and earnings.  
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potentials which is also consistent with dividend signaling theories. Hence dividends work as a 
better signal than earnings in conveying future earnings potential of the firm. 
 
These findings are consistent with Pettit (1972), Ahrony and Sawary (1980), Asquith and 
Mullins (1983). Instead of using abnormal returns, this paper offers new insight by looking at the 
changes in informed trading to understand the information content of concurrent dividends and 
earnings announcements. One of the major implications of these findings is that they 
reemphasize the need for “… adequate identification and control of information conveyed by 
earnings announcements…” (Ahrony and Sawary, 1980). Without proper identification and 
control of information environment, it could be difficult to infer the information content of 
announcements.   
 
Moreover, I find significant differences in informed trading, when dividend 
announcements contain surprises. In contrast, when dividend announcements contain no 
surprises, there is no significant change in informed trading, implying that for dividend 
announcements with no surprises, the information environment does not change significantly. 
Collectively, these findings suggest that not all dividend announcements have information 
content. A recently study by Amihud and Li (2006) suggest that information content of dividends 
is declining, contrary to this, findings presented here suggests that dividend announcements with 
surprises have significant information content. It also highlights the need to disaggregate 
different dividend announcements based on the surprises in announcements. In most of the cases 
firms do not change dividends; failure to classify announcements based on surprises may lead to 
distorted results. The results presented here are consistent with dividend signaling theories. Thus 
one of the contributions of this study is show the importance of disaggregating dividend 
announcements based on their surprises while studying their information content.    
 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents literature review. Section 3 
presents analytical research design and methodology. Section 4 provides empirical research 
design. Section 5 discusses empirical results. Finally, section 6 presents the concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 The effect of earnings announcements on market microstructure parameters: 
Ball and Brown (1968) is among the most influential papers that provides compelling 
evidence of information content of accounting earnings announcements. They find significant 
positive correlation between sign of the abnormal stock return in the month of an earnings 
announcement with the sign on the earnings change over that firm’s previous year’s earnings. 
They use a) a random walk model and b) a market model in earnings to estimate the earnings 
surprises. The association between the announcement period abnormal return and earnings 
surprises depend information content of announcements and the earnings expectation models.    
 
Beaver (1968) specify a different earnings expectation model which incorporates the 
variability of stock returns and trading volume around earnings announcements. The paper 
hypothesize increased the information flow during the earnings announcement period compared 
to non-announcement period. He uses return volatility to measure information flow. The 
empirical evidence supports his hypothesis. Lee (1992) uses intra-day return and trading volume 
and finds a statistically significant price reaction of the same sign as earnings surprises. The 
reaction occurs within 30 min of the earnings announcements; he finds no statistically 
discernible price effect thereafter. Lee also reports a short lived trading volume reported in less 
than two hours for large trades and a few hours for small trades. Landsman and Maydew (1999) 
analyze markets reactions to earnings announcements over three decades. They too find that the 
stock return volatility and trading volume are significantly greater on earnings announcements 
days, but the activity reverts to normal conditions immediately thereafter.        
 
Early research3 by Morse and Ushman (1983) study the change in daily bid-ask spreads 
surrounding quarterly earnings announcements and large price changes. They estimate actual and 
proportional bid-ask spread (remove the contemporaneous price effects). They report find no 
change in daily bid-ask spreads surrounding earnings announcements but also report increase in 
bid-ask spread on large absolute price changes. 
                                                             
3See  Kothari (2001) for a discussion of price effects of earnings announcements. 
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Vankatesh and Chiang (1986) find significant changes in the spreads after earnings 
announcements only in cases when no other material information with regard to firm was 
released in the 30-day period prior to the earnings announcements. Patel (1991) report an 
increase in bid-ask spreads after earnings announcements, while Skinner (1991) reports similar 
results only for announcements that convey large earnings surprises.   
 
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) study change in liquidity four-day period surrounding 
earnings announcements. They estimate intraday bid-ask spreads, depth and volume; report an 
increase in spreads and a decrease in depth a day before the announcement and also show 
significant increase in spread during and one day after the precise announcement time while 
depth return to non-announcements level immediately after the announcement.  
 
Krinsky and Lee (1996) decompose the intraday bid-ask spread surrounding the earnings 
announcements and report that the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spreads increases 
significantly during the announcement window and during the pre-disclosure period.   
 
Chae (2005) studies the change in daily trading volume for scheduled (earnings 
announcements) and unscheduled announcements (acquisition, target and bond rating 
announcements) reports that cumulative trading volume decrease before the scheduled 
announcements. He also reports that abnormal trading volume is also positively correlated with 
popular measures of information asymmetry. Finally, the paper reports a positive correlation 
between pre-announcements asymmetry of information between post-announcements abnormal 
trading volume. 
 
A more recent paper by Cho (2007) uses Foster and Viswanathan (1996) model 
(henceforth FV model) and provide both daily and intra-daily estimates of FV model. He reports 
that for the intra-daily data, the number of informed traders increases while level of liquidity 
trading decreases as the time of earnings announcements approaches. These findings imply that 
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as time to announcements approaches increasing number of informed traders trader on their 
private information, on the other hand the liquidity trading decreases.    
 
2.2 The effect of dividends announcements on market microstructure parameters: 
 
One of the predictions of dividend signaling models (henceforth DSM) developed in 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) is that unexpected 
dividend changes convey information about cash flow; i.e., increase (decrease) in dividend 
conveys favorable (unfavorable) information about current and/or future cash flow. Numerous 
studies have confirmed that stock prices (within the announcements period) significantly 
increase as dividends increase and vice versa. There are two main stream of papers that examine 
the empirical validity of dividend signaling hypothesis; the classical papers investigates the price 
impact of dividend announcements and the recent set of papers look at announcement effect on 
market microstructure parameters mainly on bid-ask spreads.  
 
In a classical research by Pettit (1972) it is reported that a significant price increase 
follows dividend increase announcements, and a significant price drop follows dividend decrease 
announcements, while earnings announcements have no impact on stock returns. This paper uses 
dividend and earnings expectation model to estimate the change in dividend and earnings. This 
paper studies the information effect of different level of changes in dividend, dividend omission, 
reductions, no change and initial payments.    
 
Aharony and Swary (1980) find a small prices change in response to dividend 
announcements after controlling for contemporaneous earnings announcements. To adequately 
identify the information content of dividend announcements they examine the dividend and 
earnings announcements that are made on different dates (separated by 11 days) within the 
quarter. They also employed dividend expectation model to measure the information content of 
dividend announcements.   
 
10 
 
Asquith and Mullins (1983) study the announcement effect of dividend initiations and 
report significant positive excess return. They also report that dividend initiation has larger 
impact on price than subsequent dividend changes. For robustness analysis, the study also 
estimates announcement period abnormal returns for dividend initiating firms when there are no 
other information event, when there are simultaneous earnings announcements and when there 
are other events and finds consistent results when no other events occurs with dividend 
announcements. However, the results also show lower initial impact of dividend announcements 
in the presence other announcements especially earnings announcements.      
 
Other studies examine the empirical validity of dividend signaling hypothesis e.g. Nissim 
and Ziv (2001) study the relation between changes in dividend and future profitability of the 
firm. In contrary, Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) find that changes in dividend do 
not convey information about future earnings potentials rather it convey information about 
systematic risk of a firm. Overall, a recent review article by Allen and Michealy (2003) reports 
mixed empirical evidence in favor of the dividend signaling theory.  
 
The other stream of research studies the effect of dividend announcements on market 
microstructure parameters. A pioneer research by Venkatash and Chiang (1986) find a strong 
presence of asymmetry of information (measured by the bid-ask spread adjusted for holding 
costs) for some types of announcements but not for some other types. They report that the raw 
spread increases before second announcements and hardly before first and joint announcements.4 
This result implies that for first and joint announcements there exists only normal asymmetry; on 
the other hand since second announcements are non-routine announcements, and hence 
asymmetry increases. The study does not focus on the announcements that contain dividend 
surprises. It considers all the dividend announcements and observes the impact on spread, which 
may give an incomplete result.        
 
                                                             
4Venkatash and Chiang (1986) define:  i) first announcement as the announcements that are not preceded 
by other announcements by at least 30 days, ii) second announcements as the announcements that are 
separated from the first announcements by at least 10 days but no more than 30 days, and iii) joint 
announcements are the announcements that are made on the same day. 
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Bajaj and Vijh (1995) find evidence of excess returns, increased trading volume and price 
volatility during the announcement days. Based on this finding, they comment that the observed 
excess returns during the announcement period are due to an increase in information asymmetry. 
This study focuses only on the announcement window and does not compare pre- and post-
announcement trading volume or price volatility to see how the information environment 
changes due to dividend announcements.   
 
Fuller (2003) provides direct evidence of an inverse relation between pre-announcement 
informed trading and announcement period excess returns. The study also provides evidence of a 
positive relation between pre-announcement informed trading and unexpected dividends 
changes, but it focuses only on the announcement period.  
 
More recently Graham, Koski and Loewenstein (2006) study the impact on information 
processing in financial markets for two different types of corporate announcements; 
announcements with timing that are surprise and announcements with timing known in advance. 
They estimate intra-day volume, bid-ask spread during the announcement day for initial dividend 
announcements (unanticipated announcements) and regular dividend announcements (anticipated 
announcements). The find increased intra-day spread before the very anticipated announcements 
which subsequently reaches to normal level after the announcements, whereas for the 
unanticipated announcements the spreads are normal prior to the announcements but it increases 
after the announcements. This study also reports the impact of these announcements on volume, 
abnormal returns and volatility.       
 
The review clearly reveals that there is need to investigate information content of 
dividends and earnings announcements using a metric other than abnormal returns or bid-ask 
spreads which will provide deeper understanding of announcements effect. There is also need for 
studying the information content of these announcements concurrently and separately. So this 
paper addresses the following two research questions: 1) how do concurrent dividend and 
earnings announcements affect pre- and post- announcements informed trading? 2) How do 
surprises in dividend announcements affect pre- and post- announcements informed trading?       
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3. Analytical Research design and Methodology 
3.1 Analytical Framework: 
 
3.1. a. Information content of dividend and earnings announcements: 
 
The asymmetry of information drives demand for information. There are mainly two 
sources of informed agents i) insiders, ii) informed traders (e.g. stock analysts, hedge fund 
managers, and bankers). A manager may either use dividend or earnings announcements to 
convey future profitability of the firm. According to “dividend signaling theories”, a change in 
dividend conveys information about firm’s current/future earnings potentials. Since dividend 
decision is almost at management’s discretion, a change in dividend should convey less 
ambiguous signal than earnings. Moreover, due to the “sticky” nature of dividend, signals 
conveyed by changes in dividends contain information beyond that conveyed by earnings 
number.  
 
3.1. b. Informed trading around dividend and earnings announcements: 
 
The insiders’ information is revealed in the market through the financial policy choices, 
e.g. periodic payout announcements by the firm. On the other spectrum, the informed traders 
reveal their information through trading. Since the insiders’ information is revealed periodically, 
the informed traders play a significant role in generating and disseminating information through 
their informed trading. Thus, between any two payout announcements, the extent to which 
information is going to be incorporated into prices depends on the trading behavior of the 
informed traders.  
 
The fundamental hypothesis of this research is that the extent of informed trading is 
endogenous and, at least in the short run, the extent of informed trading is affected by the in 
formativeness of payout announcements. If the informed traders know the timing of upcoming 
corporate announcements then they will acquire information if they believe the announcements 
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will have significant surprise. Hence, informed traders will have incentive to trade on their 
information prior to announcements which will lead to higher informed trading. At the 
announcements, the uncertainty associated with announcements is partially resolved, so the 
information advantage by the informed traders may not prevail which may lead to lower 
informed trading. Based on the premise, informed trading depends on the information content of 
the announcements which leads to following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis One: 
 
If earnings announcements are signal, then for concurrent earnings announcements with 
surprise, informed trading during the pre-announcement period should be higher than post-
announcement period 
 
Hypothesis Two: 
 
If dividend announcements are signal, then for concurrent dividend announcements with 
surprise, informed trading during the pre-announcement period should be higher than post-
announcement period.         
 
 
3.1. c. Surprises in dividend announcements and informed trading: 
 
If dividend announcements have surprises (i.e. the actual dividends are different than 
forecasted dividends), then informed traders will have incentive to acquire information prior to 
the announcements and informed trading will be higher during the pre-announcement period and 
subsequently it will decline since the traders no longer have the informational advantages.   
 
On the other hand, if dividend announcements do not have any surprise (i.e. the actual 
dividends are same as expected dividends), then for the informed traders there are no changes in 
the information environment during the pre- and post-announcement periods. Therefore, it can be 
anticipated that there will be no change in informed trading. This leads to following hypothesis: 
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 Hypothesis Three:   
 
If dividend announcements have surprise, then informed trading during the pre-
announcement period should be higher than post-announcement period.  
 
Hypothesis Four:  
 
If dividend announcements contain no surprise, then there will be no significant change 
in informed trading during the pre- and post- announcement periods.  
 
 
3.2 Methodology: 
 
The paper is based on an event study frame work. This section overviews some of the key 
definitions and also outlines their estimation techniques.  
 
3.2. a. Measure of surprises in dividends and earnings: 
 
 
In order to estimate the surprise in dividends and earnings, it is important to determine 
the expected dividends and earnings then compare them with the actual. But the expected 
dividends and earnings are unobservable. The majority of empirical studies5 follow the “naïve” 
method in determining dividend and earnings changes. The “naïve” method defines the surprises 
as follows6:   
 , , 1
, , , 1
j q j q
j q j q j q
E D D
D D D



  
    (1) 
 
                                                             
5 These include Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Yoon and Starks (1995), 
Benartzi Michaely Thaler (1997), Grullon Michaely Swaminathan (2002) just to name a few. See Bar-
Yosef and Sarig (1992) for a detailed comparison of different method of dividends change. 
 
6 Same definitions can be applied in measuring earnings surprises.  
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where, Dj,q is the dividends of firm ‘j’ at quarter ‘q’. The critical assumption of the “naïve 
method” is that the expected change in dividends is zero. If current dividends are different from 
the previous, then it is regarded as informativeness of dividends.  
 
Despite the popularity, there are criticisms of the “naïve” method.7 Bar-Yosef and Sarig 
(1992) present a detailed comparison of different methods to estimate dividend changes and 
report that the “naïve” model produces a biased proxy of dividend changes since it fails to 
account for an upward trend in dividends. Asquith and Mullins (1983) mention that “... the naïve 
model used in previous studies may underestimate the wealth effect of an increase in dividends.” 
Dhillon, Raman and Ramirez (2003) provide very strong evidence against the naïve model. In 
their study, about 33.97% of the sample is misclassified using the “naïve” approach when 
compared against alternative methods of dividend changes. 
 
This study uses a different measure to estimate surprises in dividends and earnings. I use 
analyst forecasts8 (I/B/E/S forecast) to compare them with the actual announcements. Hence, the 
surprises in dividend and earnings are defined as:  
Standardized Dividend Surprises 
 , ,
,
( )
(2)
ˆ
j q j q
j q
j
D Forecast D
D


   
 
where, ,j qD  are actual dividends per share of firm ‘j’ during quarter ‘q’, ,( )j qForecast D  are 
analyst forecasts of dividends per share for firm ‘j’ during quarter ‘q’, and ˆ j  are the standard 
deviations of all forecast errors  , ,( )j q j qD Forecast D in the sample. This definition of 
informativeness of dividends allows us to compare the estimated surprises across the firms. 
 
                                                             
7 Using the past sequences of dividends and timing of dividend changes, investors can construct a better 
forecasting model; in that case the expected change in dividends may not be zero as assumed in “naïve” 
method.  
 
8 Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995) provided theoretical analysis of using analyst forecast as a 
proxy for information.  
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A related issue in using the IBES dataset is the choice of forecast files9. Previous studies by 
Diether et al. (2002) and Vega (2005) show that the empirical results do not significantly change 
by using either the detail or summary forecast files. This paper uses the summary history files to 
obtain analyst forecasts. 
 
 
3.2. b. Measure of Informed Trading (Probability of Informed Trading):  
 
An important part of the analysis is to determine the extent of informed trading during 
pre- and post-dividend announcement periods. Informed trading cannot be measured directly, but 
there are several ways10 to estimate it. In a series of papers, Easley et al.11 have demonstrated a 
way to measure informed trading by looking at abnormal order flow. This measure is known as 
probability of informed trading (PIN). The underlying assumption of the PIN model is that 
public information is directly incorporated into prices without the need for trading activity, 
whereas private information is reflected in excess buying or excess selling pressure (abnormal 
order flow). Thus PIN is designed to capture the extent of informed trading by looking at the 
frequency of buy and sell orders for a stock in a given day. Any imbalance between the buying 
and selling frequency would be interpreted as trades motivated by private information, and hence 
PIN would count that into its estimation.  
 
                                                             
9 In fact, I/B/E/S data include U.S. detailed history file that contains individual analysts’ current forecasts, 
the date they submitted the forecast and the dividends announcement date. The summary history file 
contains summary statistics on analysts’ forecasts such as mean, median and standard deviations of all 
outstanding forecasts as of the third Thursday of the month. The I/B/E/S summary history file uses 
analysts’ forecasts that are not current. This error on the part of I/B/E/S can be corrected using the U.S. 
detailed history file. 
 
10 According to Huang and Stoll (1996), the adverse selection component of the spread corresponds to the 
extent of asymmetry of information, which is often used as a proxy for informed trading. Bessembinder 
(1999) proposes a price impact measure as a proxy for informed trading. 
 
11 Detailed discussion on PIN measures is available in Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara (1997), Easley, Kiefer, 
O’Hara and Paperman (1996), and Easley, O’Hara (1987, 1992). Discussion on PPIN measure is available 
on Aslan et al. (2007). 
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Using this model requires data on the number of buys and sells per day, which is not 
directly available from the empirical data. The standard procedure in the literature is to follow 
the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to determine the number of buys and sells each day from the 
intraday data. Very briefly, according to this algorithm methods, trades for which the transaction 
price is above the current mid-quote are considered buys and below the mid-quote are sells. 
Trades at the midpoint are classified depending upon the price movement of the previous trades 
and will be a buy if the midpoint is moved up. If there were no price movement, then one should 
move back to the prior price movement and use that as the benchmark and so on. 
 
According to Easley et al. (2002), this model can be estimated using the following log 
likelihood function: 
 
( )
( )
( )( , ) (1 )
! ! ! !
( )(1 )
! !
B S B S
sb s b s
B S
b s
b s b s
b s
L B S e e e e
B S B S
e e
B S
   
  
    
  
  
 
    
  

  

 
      (3) 
 
where B and S represent total buy trades and sell trades for the day, respectively, and 
( , , , , )b s       is the parameter vector. Here, (1 )   denotes the probability of a "good 
news day,"   denotes the probability of a "bad news day," and the probability of "no-news 
day" is captured by (1 ) . To maximize the likelihood function, I need to assume 
independences across the trading days. Thus, the likelihood function across T days can be 
obtained by the product of likelihoods for each day as described by the following equation: 
 
                                                
1
( ) ( , )
T
i i
i
V L M L B S 

                (4) 
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where ( iB , iS ) is trade data for day i = 1,…,T and 1 1(( ), ( ))T TM B S B S  is the data 
set. Equation (4) is maximized over θ given the data M, to determine the underlying structural 
parameters of the model (i.e. , , , ,b s     ).  
 
The estimated values of the parameters obtained from equation (4), are then used to 
construct the probability that an order is from an informed trader (PIN), which is defined by the 
following equation (as in Easley et al. (2002)): 
 
                                                        
S B
PIN 
  

 
  (5) 
where S B     is the arrival rate for all orders, i.e., from informed and uninformed 
traders, and   denotes the arrival rate for information-based orders. So PIN is the ratio of 
orders originating from informed traders relative to the overall order flow. It is important to note 
that PIN is a combination of three parameters. It is not solely determined by the arrival rate of 
informed traders. Analytically, the probability of informed trading will be higher when there are 
more frequent information events (captured by ), and/or higher arrival of informed traders 
(captured by  ), and it is lessened by the willingness of uninformed traders to hold the stock 
captured by the  ’s.  
 
For ease of computation, it is assumed that B  and s  are the same for a given day, and 
the following definition has been used for estimating PIN in this paper: 
 
2
PIN 
 


  (6) 
4. Empirical Research Design  
 
The empirical analysis focuses on two estimation windows: pre-announcement (-42 days, 
-2 days) periods and post-announcement (+2 days, +42 days) periods relative to dividend, 
earnings and share repurchase announcements dates. It is important to note that 40 calendar days 
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is approximately 28 trading days. All the study-related results refer to 28 trading days for each of 
these two windows. 
 
 The empirical analysis on dividend and earnings announcements uses the analyst 
summary forecast of dividend per share (DPS) and earnings per share (EPS) between 2002 and 
2008 obtained from I/B/E/S database. The key variables of interest are the median forecasts of 
DPS and EPS and announcement dates of dividends and earnings. The sample constitutes 
quarterly dividends and earnings forecast for the U.S. firms only. In addition, sample does not 
include firms that initiate or resume dividends. Following these sample selection criteria, 
observations are first merged with CRSP then with COMPUSTAT and finally with TAQ 
database. The merged dataset contains 5,508 observations (firms/quarters). The merged dataset is 
then used to construct several portfolios using two-stage sorting to identify and control 
information environment. To test the information content of concurrent dividend or earnings 
announcements, I construct two different portfolios. Portfolio one includes the firms (107 
observations) that have highest absolute surprise in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in 
earnings. Both portfolios only consider concurrent dividends and earnings announcements. For 
both portfolios, the absolute surprises are first sort into decile then the top decile is further sorted 
into quartiles.  The two stage sorting is an innovative research design over the extent literature. 
This allows for adequate control of information pertaining to dividend announcements while 
studying the information content of earnings announcements and vice-versa. Once the portfolios 
are created then trades and quotes data are used to determine the number of buys and sells to 
estimate PIN.  
 
I further construct two different portfolios to examine how surprises in dividends affect 
pre- and post-announcements informed trading. The surprises in dividends and earnings are 
estimated using the actual and analyst forecast of dividends and earnings for the period of 2002 
to 2005. While constructing these portfolios, I relax the assumption of concurrent dividend and 
earnings announcements. Hence, Portfolio three includes only the firms (107 observations) that 
have highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings; on the 
other hand Portfolio four contains the firms (107 observations) that have lowest absolute 
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surprises in dividends and earnings.  Comparing the pre- and post-announcements informed 
trading for these portfolios will help understanding whether all dividend announcements have 
information content. The Portfolio four contains the firms that rarely change their dividends; in 
my sample there are 754 observations. Since the sample size for the bottom quartile is reasonably 
large, the study only looks at a representative sample. To draw the representative sample of 107 
observations (to make even comparison with the Portfolio three) out of 754, Portfolio four is 
further sorted by size of firms and years and within each size-year quartiles firms are selected 
randomly [the number of firms to select from each size quartile is proportional to the weight of 
each size quartile in the entire sample]. 
 
      
5. Empirical results and analysis 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for Portfolio one.  The average absolute surprises 
in earnings for the firms in this Portfolio are 11.81 whereas the average absolute surprises in 
dividends are zero.  Thus, the double sorting method ensures studying the appropriate earnings 
announcements.  Since the average absolute surprises in dividends is zero, hence any information 
reveled by managements pertain to earnings only.  
 
Table 2 reports the differences in probability of informed trading for Portfolio one; it is 
evident that for absolute surprises in earnings, the cross-sectional difference in PIN is not 
statistically significant. Further, for positive and negative announcements surprises, I also do not 
find any change in cross-sectional PIN.  In all the three cases, the differences in PIN are positive 
which implies that informed trading before the announcements is higher than after the 
announcements.  
 
The results also show that on an average the differences in cross-sectional arrival rate of 
informed traders and uninformed traders are negative. It is plausible that the uninformed traders 
anticipate presence of informed traders prior to announcements that might induce them to trade 
after the announcements. On the other hand, the informed traders may find opportunities to trade 
after the announcements; it is also plausible that due to superior interpretation skill they take 
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advantage of the asymmetry of information that prevails immediately after the announcements. 
The management occasionally issue earnings guideline (management forecasts) for the analyst 
prior to the actual announcements. The management guidelines often remove uncertainty 
associated with actual earnings announcements; as a result, the informed traders may no longer 
have the informational advantage, which may lead to lower informed trading prior to the 
announcements.  
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for Portfolio two, that contains the firms with highest 
absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings. The average absolute 
surprises in dividends are 7.68 which is lower than that of earnings, but the average surprise in 
dividends are 2.28 whereas average surprises in earnings is 0.76. The average market 
capitalization for these firms is 19.0 million, which is similar to that of firms in Portfolio one. 
The quoted spreads, effective spreads and relative spreads are also similar for both the Portfolios. 
Table 4 shows the cross sectional differences in PIN parameters for Portfolio two. There is 
significant difference in PIN for the firms that have highest absolute surprises in dividends and 
lowest absolute surprises in earnings. 
 
This result implies that for concurrent dividend announcements with surprises, the 
informed traders prefer to trade prior to announcements. The difference in informed trading 
reflects the information content of dividend announcements. Combining the results presented in 
table 2 and 4 it is evident that dividend announcements with surprises convey information above 
and beyond what is contained in earnings announcements.                     
 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for Portfolio three in Panel A and Portfolio four in Panel 
B. Portfolio three contains firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute 
surprises in earnings, when dividends and earnings are announced anytime during the estimation 
window.  One of the key features of firms in Portfolio three is that the surprises are not 
concentrated on any one size-quartile and there is no monotonic relation between the size of the 
firm and the surprises in dividends. By construction, the bottom decile firms have zero surprises. 
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Further, the average surprises in earnings are very small, and there is no monotonic relation 
between the size of the firm and surprises in earnings.     
 
 
The estimates in Table 6 explain that there is a statistically significant difference in cross-
sectional informed trading for the firms in Portfolio three. This result implies that dividend 
announcements with surprises have information content after controlling for the information 
content in earnings announcements regardless whether the announcements are made concurrently 
or separately.     
 
It is apparent that during the post-announcement period, ‘alpha (α)’ decreases while 
‘delta (δ)’ increases marginally and ‘epsilon (ε)’ increases but ‘mu (µ)’ decreases. This means 
that the post-announcement periods can be characterized by the higher cross-sectional arrival of 
uninformed traders (captured by ‘epsilon (ε)’) and lower cross-sectional arrival of informed 
traders (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) on average. 
 
The differences in arrival rates are one of the key factors that contribute to lower 
informed trading during post-announcement periods. This result is consistent with the 
classical market microstructure theory that suggests a reduction in the degree of 
information asymmetry after public announcements (Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle 
(1985)). The essence of this result is that when the timing of information events is fairly 
predicted, it is more likely that uninformed traders will lose to informed traders (i.e., 
adverse selection problems get worse) if they trade before the announcements.12 For that 
reason, uninformed traders’ hold back and trade after the announcements. On the other 
hand, informed traders’ have less informational advantage during the post-announcement 
period, since they already traded based on their superior information prior to the 
announcements.   
 
                                                             
12 In a similar study, Cho (2007) reports that as the timing of the earnings announcements approaches, the 
number of informed traders increases and liquidity trading decreases.  
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In short, the result from Table 6 indicates that surprises in dividends have an impact on 
the extent of informed trading during the pre- and post-dividend announcement periods. By 
construction, for this sample, the timing of announcements is fairly accurately predicted but 
the contents are not, and that contributes towards the increased asymmetry of information 
and hence increased informed trading prior to announcements. Once the announcements are 
made, there is no incremental benefit from the superior information of informed traders; 
hence informed trading decreases.        
 
Table 7 reveals that, on average, PIN for small firms is larger than that for large firms. 
This happens because the asymmetry of information for smaller firms is higher than the larger 
firms, which suggests higher private information-based trading for smaller firms.  This negative 
relation between PIN and size is also reported in Easley et al. (2002). 
 
Several cross-sectional features can be observed by comparing quartile one (smaller 
firms) and quartile four (larger firms). First, there exists a significant difference in the cross-
sectional arrival of information (captured by ‘alpha (α)’) during the pre- and post-announcement 
periods for these portfolios. This is expected, since on a given day it is more likely to obtain 
information for large firms than for small firms. Second, cross-sectionally there exists a 
significant difference in the arrival of informed traders (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) during the pre- 
and post-announcement periods for these portfolios. Moreover, the cross sectional arrival rate of 
informed traders for these portfolios is higher during the pre-announcement period than post-
announcement period, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Thirdly, there is a significant 
difference in the cross-sectional arrival rate of uninformed traders (captured by ‘epsilon (ε)’) 
during the pre- and post-announcement periods. Unlike the smaller firms, the arrival of 
uninformed traders during the post- announcement period is higher than the pre-announcement 
period for the larger firms, which is also consistent with our hypothesis. Finally, the effect of 
surprises in dividends on informed trading (PIN) is also visible across the size distributions.  
 
From Table 8, it is apparent that there exists no significant difference in PIN for firms 
with zero surprises in dividends. This result implies that there is no significant change in the 
24 
 
information environment during the pre- and post-dividend announcement periods. It is also 
consistent with the dividend signaling theories. If there are no surprises in dividends, then there 
is no new information conveyed, and hence there are no significant changes in informed trading 
during pre- and post-announcement periods. It appears that the cross-sectional arrival rate of 
informed (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) and uninformed traders (captured by ‘epsilon (ε)’) are higher 
during the pre-announcement period, unlike the case when dividends contain surprises. When 
dividends carry no new information (i.e. no surprises), liquidity traders on average prefer to trade 
during the pre-announcement period rather than the post-announcement period. The essence of 
this result is that the liquidity traders face less risk of losing to informed traders when dividends 
contain no surprises.  
   
The findings presented in Tables 6 and 8 suggest that the decline in information 
asymmetry depends on the information contents of announcements. If announcements have 
surprises, then the asymmetry of information during the post-announcement period declines. If 
announcements do not have surprises, then there is no significant change in information 
asymmetry during pre- and post-announcement periods.   
 
Table 9 presents the distribution of parameters estimates from the log likelihood function 
sorted into quartiles based on firm size. A detailed comparison of pre- and post-announcement 
periods PINs across quartiles sorted by firm size reveals that PIN, on an average, declines 
moving from smaller to larger firms.  
 
This is again consistent with the existing findings in the literature. Similar to the top 
decile firms, several key features emerge from Table 9. As the firm size increases, the cross-
sectional arrival rate of informed (captured by ‘mu (µ)’) and uninformed traders (captured by 
‘epsilon (ε)’) increases. Cross-sectionally, the uninformed traders prefer to trade more during the 
pre- announcements in larger firms compared to smaller firms. This is consistent, since for larger 
firms, in case of no surprises in dividends, there is less risk of potential loss from trading against 
the informed traders. Finally, even in the case of no dividend surprises, cross-sectionally 
informed traders prefer to trade pre-announcements regardless of the size of the firm.   
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6. Conclusion 
This paper introduces a new dimension to extent literature by assessing the information 
content of corporate announcements using informed trading. This research considers a market 
set- up where the information environment is not exogenous; rather, it depends on the content of 
corporate announcements. Instead of studying the price impact of announcements, this paper 
studies the impact of corporate announcements on informed trading.  
 
The study tests the hypothesis that informed trading depends on the information content 
of corporate announcements. If an announcement has surprise then pre-announcements informed 
trading will be higher than post –announcements, whereas for announcements with no surprises 
there will be no change in informed trading. I test these hypotheses by constructing several 
portfolios of dividends and earnings announcements. The unique feature of this research design 
is that it adequately identifies and controls the information environment pertaining to dividends, 
and earnings announcements. It also studies the information content of dividend and earnings 
announcements when they are made concurrently and separately. Empirical results confirm that 
for earnings announcements with surprises, there are no significant differences in cross-sectional 
informed trading after controlling for concurrent dividends announcements, on the other hand for 
dividend announcements with surprises, I find a significant change in cross-sectional informed 
trading before and after the announcements after controlling for concurrent earnings 
announcements. I relax the assumption concurrent announcements and find that dividend 
announcements with surprises have significant change in informed trading after controlling for 
earnings surprises, whereas for dividend announcements with no surprises, I find no significant 
change in informed trading after controlling for earnings surprises.  
 
Collectively, these results suggest that dividend announcements contain information 
beyond that is conveyed by the earnings announcements. This is consistent with the finding by 
Pettit (1972), Ahrony and Sawary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983) It is widely viewed that 
earnings are “variable”; moreover, management provides “earnings guidelines” periodically 
which help market and analyst update their predictions. Hence, by the time firm makes earnings 
announcement, surprises in earnings no longer convey significant information. On the other 
26 
 
hand, dividends are viewed as “sticky” and usually management do not change (increase or 
decrease) dividends often; as a result change in dividends conveys significant information about 
firm’s future earnings potentials which is also consistent with dividend signaling theories. Hence 
it is dividends not earnings that convey a signal to the market.  Another implication of this result 
is that not all dividends announcements have information content. A recently study by Amihud 
and Li (2006) suggest that information content of dividends is declining, contrary to this, 
findings presented here suggests that dividend announcements with surprises have significant 
information content. It also highlights the need to disaggregate the dividend announcements 
based on the surprises in announcements, since in most of the cases firms do not change 
dividends, failure to study information content of announcements based on surprises may lead to 
distorted results.  
 
  Future research in this area requires a theoretical model with richer prediction on effect 
of corporate announcements on informed trading. The extent literature mostly focuses on the 
market microstructure parameters other than informed trading.  
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Appendix A 
Probability of Informed Trading 
 
According to Easley et al. (2002), there are three major players in this structural model: i) 
informed traders, ii) market makers, iii) uninformed traders. The game is repeated over trading 
days i=1,…,T. First, nature chooses whether there is new information at the beginning of the 
trading day, and these events occur with probability .  The new information is a signal 
regarding the underlying asset value, where good news is that the asset is worth ,iV  and bad 
news is that it is worth iV . If an event occurs, then the probability of good news is (1 )  and 
that of bad news is  . In this game traders arrive according to Poisson processes throughout the 
day. Orders from informed traders arrive at rate  (on information event days), orders from 
uninformed buyers arrive at rate b .  And orders from uninformed sellers arrive at rate s . Traders 
informed with bad news sell and those informed    with good news buy. That is, on a good news 
day, the arrival rates are b   for buy orders and s  for sell orders. On bad news days, the 
arrival rates are b  for buy orders and s   for sell orders. On no-news days, only uninformed 
traders arrive, and the arrival rate of both buys and sells are b  and s  respectively.  If an order 
arrives at time t, the market maker observes the trade (either a buy or a sell), and he uses this 
information to update his beliefs.  New prices are set, trades evolve, and the price process moves 
in response to the market maker’s changing beliefs. This process is captured in Figure 1 [as in 
Easley et al. (2002).   
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Figure-1 
Tree diagram of the trading process 
 
This figure helps to parameterize the model as described in the original paper. Once   the 
model is parameterized it can be estimated using maximum likelihood method.  
 
Buy arrival Rate: b  
 
 
 
 
Sell Arrival Rate: s   
Buy Arrival Rate: b   
 
 
 
Sell Arrival Rate: s  
Signal High:1   
Signal Low:  
Information event 
Occurs:    
Information event does 
Not Occur: 1-  
Once per  
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Appendix-B 
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for Portfolio One  
 
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Earnings and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends) 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Q1 Q2 
ASK 118 51.41 48.42 26.55 6.63 131.15 30.84 66.00 
BID 118 46.95 43.83 24.63 6.05 112.07 28.22 60.40 
Price 118 49.76 45.88 26.45 6.63 129.93 29.38 64.58 
Share Outstanding 118 283,421 93,099 620,178 11,181 5,832,488 43,565 264,024 
Market Capitalization 118 16,297,935 4,642,275 44,429,682 304,648 447,000,000 1,570,156 14,344,064 
Volume 118 528,835 185,252 1,122,830 6,603 8,430,917 63,789 454,498 
Forecasted DPS 118 0.33 0.25 0.54 - 5.00 0.10 0.40 
Forecasted EPS 118 1.00 0.76 2.16 (7.00) 18.10 0.34 1.33 
Surprise in EPS 118 0.76 5.10 19.00 (99.98) 47.44 (5.70) 7.51 
Surprise in DPS 118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Absolute Surprise in EPS 118 11.81 6.91 14.87 4.05 99.98 5.40 10.81 
Absolute Surprise in DPS 118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Quoted spread 118 4.45 3.28 3.79 0.58 23.16 2.02 5.61 
Effective spread 118 3.20 1.78 3.79 0.05 21.33 0.77 4.30 
Relative spread 118 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.45 0.05 0.11 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for portfolio one which includes firms with highest absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute 
surprises in dividends. The sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and earnings 
announcements are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases.  Ask is the ask 
price, Bid is the bid price, Market Capitalization is the product of market price and total number of share outstanding, Volume is the number of 
shares traded, Forecasted DPS is the analyst forecast of dividend per share, Forecasted EPS is the analyst forecast of earnings per share, Surprise in 
EPS is the difference between actual and forecasted earnings per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error, Surprise in DPS is the 
difference between actual and forecasted dividend per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error. Absolute surprises in EPS and DPS 
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are the absolute difference in earnings and dividend per share. Quoted spread is defined as (Ask – Bid), Effective spread is defined as 2|Transaction 
price-Midpoint of bid and ask| and Relative spread is defined as (Ask - Bid)/((Ask + Bid)/2). Mean, Median and standard deviation is the average, 
median and the standard deviation for respective parameters. Q1 and Q2 are first quartile and second quartile respectively.                                        .           
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TABLE 2: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio One 
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Earnings and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends) 
 
 N Differences in 
Alpha 
Differences in 
Delta 
Differences in 
Epsilon 
Differences in 
Mu 
Differences in 
PIN 
Absolute Surprises  118 0.0196 -0.0114 -282.9 -137.0 0.00534 (1.87) 
Positive Surprises in 
Earnings  75 0.00430 -0.0154 -331.6 -137.5 
0.00443 
(1.32) 
Negative Surprises in 
Earnings  43 0.0463 -0.00443 -331.6 -136.1 
0.00692 
(1.31) 
 
This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio one (118 observations) which constructed by 
sorting firms with highest absolute surprises in earnings and lowest absolute surprises in dividends. The 
sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and 
earnings announcements are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days 
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated 
by maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of 
PIN. The surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected 
dividends and earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN 
parameters alpha explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents 
arrival of informed traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders.  Parenthesis includes t-
statistics.
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TABLE 3: Summary Statistics for Portfolio Two 
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum Q1 Q2 
ASK 107 45.94 44.65 22.21 6.04 127.91 29.66 59.64 
BID 107 41.38 40.46 18.58 4.84 102.35 27.67 54.45 
Price 107 43.10 41.36 19.24 5.91 110.92 28.08 56.61 
Share Outstanding 107 480,595 160,200 898,141 13,266 6,468,000 63,743 404,644 
Market Capitalization 107 19,085,673 7,729,650 30,875,646 307,241 176,000,000 2,410,896 18,261,173 
Volume 107 571,161 227,359 1,700,151 4,346 17,171,814 91,023 461,784 
Forecasted EPS 107 0.54 0.42 0.36 (0.90) 1.64 0.32 0.77 
Forecasted DPS 107 0.24 0.19 0.20 0 1.04 0.07 0.35 
Surprise in EPS 107 0.06 0 0.23 (0.30) 0.30 0 0.30 
Surprise in DPS 107 2.28 1.61 15.12 (74.64) 79.55 (2.41) 3.21 
Absolute Surprise in EPS 107 0.19 0.30 0.14 0 0.30 0 0.30 
Absolute Surprise in DPS 107 7.68 2.41 13.20 1.61 79.55 1.61 7.23 
Quoted spread 107 4.56 2.67 9.91 0.61 88.74 1.92 3.97 
Effective spread 107 3.42 1.74 9.93 0.00 88.74 0.94 2.69 
Relative spread 107 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.02 1.06 0.05 0.10 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for portfolio two which includes firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute 
surprises in earnings. The sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and earnings announcements 
are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases.  Ask is the ask price, Bid is the bid 
price, Market Capitalization is the product of market price and total number of share outstanding, Volume is the number of shares traded, 
Forecasted DPS is the analyst forecast of dividend per share, Forecasted EPS is the analyst forecast of earnings per share, Surprise in EPS is the 
difference between actual and forecasted earnings per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error, Surprise in DPS is the difference 
between actual and forecasted dividend per share standardized by the cross-sectional forecast error. Absolute surprises in EPS and DPS are the 
absolute difference in earnings and dividend per share. Quoted spread is defined as (Ask – Bid), Effective spread is defined as 2|Transaction price-
Midpoint of bid and ask| and Relative spread is defined as (Ask - Bid)/((Ask + Bid)/2). Mean, Median and standard deviation is the average, 
median and the standard deviation for respective parameters. Q1 and Q2 are first quartile and second quartile respectively.                                                                                                             
.                                           
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TABLE 4: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio Two 
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
 
 N Differences in 
Alpha 
Differences in 
Delta 
Differences in 
Epsilon 
Differences in 
Mu 
Differences in 
PIN 
Absolute 
Surprises  
 
107 0.0134 -0.0105 -52.90 -26.99 0.00656* (2.58) 
Positive 
Surprises in 
Dividends  
69 0.00120 -0.00948 -94.75 -47.32 0.00493 (1.85) 
Negative 
Surprises in 
Dividends  
38 0.0356 -0.0123 23.08 9.92 0.00952 (1.79) 
 
This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio two (107 observations) which constructed by sorting 
firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings. The sample 
period used in this table is 2002 to 2008. For this table only the concurrent dividends and earnings 
announcements are considered. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days 
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by 
maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN. 
The surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and 
earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha 
explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed 
traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders.  Parenthesis includes t-statistics. 
* denotes significance at 5% level. 
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TABLE 5:  Size wise Distribution of Firms in Portfolio Three (Panel A) 
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
                  
Variables Quartile 1 
(N=26) 
Quartile 2 
(N=27)  
Quartile 3  
(N=26) 
Quartile 4 
(N=27) 
Absolute Surprises in DPS 10.63 17.19 15.78 17.77 
Absolute Surprises in EPS 0.1331 0.0872 0.0612 0.0693 
Firm Size(mm $) 448.58 1377.31 7003.96 57257.84 
 
     
 
TABLE 5: Size wise Distribution of Firms in Portfolio Four (Panel B) 
 
(Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
 
Variables Quartile 1 
(N=23) 
Quartile 2 
(N=27) 
Quartile 3 
(N=30) 
Quartile 4 
(N=24) 
Absolute Surprises in DPS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Absolute Surprises in EPS 0.0839 0.0736 0.0505 0.0759 
Firm Size(mm $) 364.87 1464.93 4186.26 30120.77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the absolute surprises in dividends and earnings announcements for a sample of 
U.S. firms. The sample for this study focuses on quarterly dividends announcements between 2002 and 
2005. The sample does not include firms that initiate or resume dividends. The surprises in dividends 
and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and earnings respectively. 
The actual and expected dividends and earnings are obtained from summary history files of I/B/E/S. 
The firms in the sample are sorted into deciles based on absolute surprises in dividends and then again 
sorted into quartiles based on absolute surprises in earnings. Portfolio three includes the firms with 
highest absolute surprises in dividend and lowest absolute surprises in earnings [107 observations]. 
Portfolio four constitute firms with lowest absolute surprises in dividends and earnings [107 
observations]  In panel A, the firms in Portfolio three are further sorted into quartiles by firm size, 
where firm size is estimated by market capitalization on the first day of the quarter obtained from 
CRSP. In panel B, the firms in Portfolio four are sorted based on firm size. Parenthesis includes t-
statistics. 
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TABLE 6: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio Three 
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
 
 Event Windows Alpha(α) Delta(δ) Mu(µ) Epsilon(ε) PIN 
Pre- Announcements 0.4456 0.3631 335.41 719.08 0.1192 
Post- Announcements 0.4428 0.3706 299.85 723.42 0.1086 
Difference (Pre-Post)     0.0106* 
(2.47)    
This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio three (107 observations) which constructed by sorting 
firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in earnings. The sample 
period used in this table is 2002 to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days 
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by 
maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN. The 
surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and 
earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha 
explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed 
traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders.  Parenthesis includes t-statistics. 
* denotes significance at 5% level.  
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TABLE 7: Size-wise Distribution of PIN Parameters for Portfolio Three 
 
(Highest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
 
 
Event Windows Alpha(α) Delta(δ) Mu(µ) Epsilon(ε) PIN 
 Quartile One (Small Firms) 
Pre- Announcements 0.3579 0.4277 127.15 124.57 0.1514 
Post- Announcements 0.4060 0.3796 89.54 110.38 0.1520 
 Quartile Two 
Pre- Announcements 0.4434 0.3371 223.06 298.04 0.1337 
Post- Announcements 0.3930 0.4211 198.29 307.26 0.1110 
 Quartile Three 
Pre- Announcements 0.5041 0.3582 370.13 793.94 0.1115 
Post- Announcements 0.4643 0.3348 370.40 808.17 0.0967 
 Quartile Four (Large Firm) 
Pre- Announcements 0.4745 0.3293 621.31 1,659.77 0.0801 
Post- Announcements 0.5079 0.3467 541.17 1,667.87 0.0746 
 Quartile One - Quartile Four 
Pre- Announcements 
-0.1176** 
(-2.98) 
0.0979 
(1.45) 
-496.52** 
(-7.21) 
-1540.88** 
(-13.24) 
0.0712** 
(6.44) 
Post- Announcements 
-0.1100** 
(-2.99) 
0.0291 
(0.47) 
-449.44** 
(-9.67) 
-1563.93** 
(-14.17) 
0.0767** 
(10.22) 
 
This table shows the size-wise distribution of estimated PIN for portfolio three (107 observations) which 
constructed by sorting firms with highest absolute surprises in dividends and lowest absolute surprises in 
earnings. The sample period used in this table is 2002 to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging 
I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 
trading days relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is 
estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail 
estimation of PIN. The surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and 
expected dividends and earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The 
PIN parameters alpha explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu 
represents arrival of informed traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders. The firm size is 
estimated by computing the market capitalization for each firm in the beginning of the sample year.  
Parenthesis includes t-statistics. 
** denotes significance at 1% level.          
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TABLE 8: Cross-Sectional Differences in PIN Parameters for Portfolio Four 
 
(Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
 
Event Windows Alpha(α) Delta(δ) Mu(µ) Epsilon(ε) PIN 
Pre- Announcements 0.4294 0.3501 292.722 619.519 0.1182 
Post- Announcements 0.4490 0.3469 272.282 561.528 0.1193 
Difference (Pre-Post)     -0.0012 (-0.27) 
 
This table shows the estimated PIN for portfolio four (107 observations) which constructed by sorting 
firms with lowest absolute surprises in dividends and earnings. The sample period used in this table is 2002 
to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. 
The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days relative to the announcements days [-2 
days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function. 
The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN. The surprises in dividends and earnings are 
estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and earnings respectively using the summary 
forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha explains arrival of information, delta 
estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed traders and epsilon shows arrival of 
uninformed traders.  Parenthesis includes t-statistics. 
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TABLE 9: Size-wise Distribution of PIN Parameters for Portfolio Four 
 
(Lowest Absolute Surprises in Dividends and Lowest Absolute Surprises in Earnings) 
 
 
Event Windows Alpha(α) Delta(δ) Mu(µ) Epsilon(ε) PIN 
 Quartile One (Small Firms) 
Pre- Announcements 0.4275 0.4435 102.94 94.67 0.1829 
Post- Announcements 0.4122 0.3949 104.15 103.76 0.1776 
 Quartile Two 
Pre- Announcements 0.3836 0.3937 181.91 256.83 0.1157 
Post- Announcements 0.4353 0.3965 174.79 259.74 0.1213 
  Quartile Three 
Pre- Announcements 0.4598 0.3179 338.70 782.24 0.0987 
Post- Announcements 0.4922 0.3252 308.05 625.12 0.1073 
 Quartile Four (Large Firm) 
Pre- Announcements 0.4452 0.2517 541.78 1327.13 0.0832 
Post- Announcements 0.4456 0.2721 498.38 1260.25 0.0763 
 Quartile One - Quartile Four 
Pre- Announcements -0.0247 
(-0.48) 
0.2135** 
(2.84) 
-440.10** 
(-5.21) 
-1211.71** 
(-6.79) 
0.0978** 
(5.37) 
Post- Announcements -0.0408 
(-1.02) 
0.1490 
(1.80) 
-379.10** 
(-4.90) 
-1140.77** 
(-7.67) 
0.1009** 
(8.68) 
 
This table shows the size-wise distribution of estimated PIN for portfolio four (107 observations) which 
constructed by sorting firms with lowest absolute surprises in dividends and in earnings. The sample period 
used in this table is 2002 to 2005. The final sample is constructed by merging I/B/E/S, CRSP, 
COMPUSTAT and TAQ databases. The pre- and post-announcements periods constitute 28 trading days 
relative to the announcements days [-2 days to -40 days and +2 days to +40 days]. The PIN is estimated by 
maximizing the log likelihood function. The methodology section outlines the detail estimation of PIN. The 
surprises in dividends and earnings are estimated by comparing the actual and expected dividends and 
earnings respectively using the summary forecast files from I/B/E/S dataset. The PIN parameters alpha 
explains arrival of information, delta estimates probability of bad news, mu represents arrival of informed 
traders and epsilon shows arrival of uninformed traders. The firm size is estimated by computing the market 
capitalization for each firm in the beginning of the sample year.  Parenthesis includes t-statistics. 
     ** denotes significance at 1% level.  
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